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IQBAL AND THE SLIDE TOWARD 
RESTRICTIVE PROCEDURE 
by 
A. Benjamin Spencer* 
Last term, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court affirmed its 
commitment to more stringent pleading standards in the ordinary federal 
civil case. Although the decision is not a watershed, since it merely 
underscores the substantial changes to pleading doctrine wrought in Bell 
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, Iqbal is disconcerting for at least two 
reasons. First, the Court treated Iqbal’s factual allegations in a manner 
that further erodes the assumption-of-truth rule that has been the 
cornerstone of modern federal civil pleading practice. The result is an 
approach to pleading that is governed by a subjective, malleable 
standard that permits judges to reject pleadings based on their own 
predilections or “experience and common sense.” Such an approach 
undermines consistency and predictability in the pleading area and 
supplants, in no small measure, the traditional fact-finding role of the 
jury. Second, the Court struck a blow against the liberal ethos in civil 
procedure by endorsing pleading standards that will make it increasingly 
difficult for members of societal out-groups to challenge the unlawful 
practices of dominant interests such as employers, government officials, 
or major corporations. Thus, although Iqbal ultimately does not go 
much further than Twombly in reshaping civil pleading standards, the 
decision is an important milestone in the steady slide toward 
restrictiveness that has characterized procedural doctrine in recent years. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2007, the Supreme Court decided Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,1 a 
case that portended significant alterations to federal civil pleading 
standards under Rule 8.2 Specifically, Twombly did away with the “no set of 
facts” standard of Conley v. Gibson3 and introduced the notion that Rule 8 
requires a claimant to plead facts showing plausible entitlement to relief 
in order to survive a motion to dismiss.4 Thus was born plausibility 
pleading.5 However, after Twombly there was some uncertainty regarding 
whether the case signaled a new era in pleading similar to the seismic 
shift in how courts approached pleading before and after the advent of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938. Many observers argued that 
Twombly did not represent a major change in pleading doctrine and in 
any event merely reflected the approach to pleading that was prevalent 
among the lower federal courts.6 Others, including this writer, suggested 
that Twombly was much more consequential than the Court itself was 
letting on,7 at least from a doctrinal perspective if not also from a 
practical perspective.8 
That debate has been settled. Last term, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the 
Supreme Court made it abundantly clear that we are indeed in a new era 
of pleading by ruling that, in a civil complaint, so-called well-pleaded 
(read: non-conclusory) substantiating facts are essential to support 
allegations of wrongdoing and convince a judge of the plausibility of 
claims contained therein.9 One thing that is remarkable about this case is 
the Court’s decision to permit judges to disregard certain alleged facts 
and use their “experience and common sense” to evaluate the plausibility 
of a claim,10 rather than holding them to the traditional and more 
objective approach of determining whether the alleged facts, taken as 
 
1 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007). 
2 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). 
3 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
4 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1955, 1966–67. 
5 A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 431–32 (2008). 
6 See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Twombly Revolution?, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 1063, 1098 
(2009). 
7 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Pleading Standards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 135, 137–38 (2007), http://www.virginialawreview.org/ 
inbrief/2007/07/09/dodson.pdf; Spencer, supra note 5, at 441–42; Leading Cases, 
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, Civil Procedure, Pleading Standards, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
305, 310–11 (2007); Posting of Michael C. Dorf to Dorf on Law, The End of Notice 
Pleading, http://michaeldorf.org/2007/05/end-of-notice-pleading.html (May 24, 
2007, 7:35 AM) (“[Twombly] will likely do great damage in the lower courts.”). 
8 A. Benjamin Spencer, Pleading Civil Rights Claims in the Post-Conley Era, 52 HOW. 
L.J. 99, 157 (2008). 
9 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). 
10 Id. 
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true, entitle the pleader to relief.11 Another remarkable aspect of the 
decision is the Court’s blatant departure from the role of neutral arbiter 
to that of a pro-defendant gatekeeper, at least in the civil context. Both of 
these developments are troubling because they foster an environment 
that is increasingly hostile to civil claimants, particularly those seeking to 
challenge the unlawful conduct of societal elites such as government 
officials, large corporations, or employers. Below, this Article briefly looks 
at the road to Iqbal, followed by a discussion of some of the unfortunate 
legal developments that follow in Iqbal’s wake. 
II. PLEADING DOCTRINE THROUGH IQBAL 
The history of federal civil pleading standards has been told too 
many times to be repeated here.12 Suffice it to say that the 1938 Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, coupled with the Court’s decision in Conley v. 
Gibson that a claim may not be dismissed unless there was “no set of facts” 
that the plaintiff could offer to prove his or her claim,13 established a 
system referred to as “notice pleading” in federal civil cases.14 Under 
notice pleading, a claimant was not required “to set out in detail the facts 
upon which he bases his claim,”15 all of the claimant’s factual allegations 
were to be accepted as true at the pleading stage,16 and the plaintiff was 
entitled to all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the 
picture presented by those facts.17 Further, as the Court most recently 
affirmed in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema,18 requiring particularized pleading, as 
some lower courts at times had been doing, was inconsistent with the 
official forms appended to the rules and the fact that the Rules expressly 
 
11 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 n.1 (2002) (“Because we review 
here a decision granting respondent’s motion to dismiss, we must accept as true all of 
the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”). 
12 See, e.g., Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 439–40, 445–52 (1986); Spencer, supra note 5, 
at 434–39. 
13 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
14 Id. at 47 (“To the contrary, all the Rules require is ‘a short and plain statement 
of the claim’ that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests.” (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a))). I have previously 
remarked that notice truly has little to do with determining whether a statement of a 
claim is sufficient. See A. Benjamin Spencer, Understanding Pleading Doctrine, 108 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 19 (2009). 
15 Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. 
16 Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 508 n.1. 
17 Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126, 143 (3d Cir. 
2004) (“A motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(6) may be granted only if, 
accepting all well pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all 
reasonable factual inferences in favor of the plaintiff, it appears beyond doubt that 
the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would warrant 
relief.”). 
18 534 U.S. 506 (2002). 
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provided for such heightened pleading for fraud cases.19 It was also 
inconsistent with the established process for changing the substance of 
the Federal Rules, which was to be through rulemaking amendments and 
not judicial interpretation.20 
Then came the Twombly decision. The Court in Twombly abrogated 
the “no set of facts” language in Conley and presented a new 
interpretation of Rule 8’s pleading standard that seemed to undo much 
of what was previously understood about pleading doctrine.21 Instead of 
disclaiming the need to plead detailed facts, the Twombly Court indicated 
that stating a claim “requires a complaint with enough factual matter 
(taken as true) to suggest” that the allegations of wrongdoing are true 
and that “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief 
above the speculative level.”22 The Court spoke of “[t]he need at the 
pleading stage for allegations plausibly suggesting (not merely consistent 
with)” liability, pushing the claim past “the line between possibility and 
plausibility.”23 As I have written elsewhere, offering such facts before 
discovery begins seems particularly problematic for claimants alleging 
concealed wrongdoing,24 and there may be some evidence to that effect.25 
Ironically, the tightening of pleading standards in Twombly was motivated 
by a desire to prevent plaintiffs with unsubstantiated claims from 
accessing the discovery process and its attendant costs,26 even though 
such discovery is the very thing that might enable plaintiffs to adduce 
facts that support their legal claims.27 Ultimately, notwithstanding a 
subsequent seeming nod to the continuing vitality of notice pleading28 
and the effort of some scholars to downplay Twombly’s significance,29 
Twombly was a landmark decision that signaled a turn away from the 
liberal ethos that simplified pleading was meant to reflect, toward a more 
 
19 Id. at 513 & n.4. 
20 Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). 
21 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1968–69 (2007) (citing Conley v. 
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)). 
22 Id. at 1965. 
23 Id. at 1966. 
24 Spencer, supra note 5, at 481–82. 
25 Spencer, supra note 8, at 102, 141–42; Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About 
Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 
83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1811, 1815 (2008) (“[T]he one area in which this study does 
show a significant departure from previous dismissal practice is the civil rights field.”). 
26 Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1966–67. 
27 See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (“Before 
discovery has unearthed relevant facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define the 
precise formulation of the required prima facie case in a particular case.”). 
28 Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). 
29 See Smith, supra note 6, at 1097–98. 
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restrictive sentiment that saw access to court as something that needed to 
be constrained for some number of plaintiffs.30 
With the arrival of Iqbal, we now have our first opportunity to see 
how the Court interprets and applies what it wrought in Twombly. Iqbal 
involved an action by a Pakistani national and member of the Muslim 
faith who was arrested in the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
and subsequently detained and designated as a “person of high interest” 
to the federal government’s investigation of the attacks.31 Iqbal alleged 
that his designation and subsequent harsh treatment while in detention 
were unconstitutionally discriminatory and that then-Attorney General 
John Ashcroft and FBI Director Robert Mueller were personally and 
overtly complicit in developing and imposing the policy underlying his 
treatment: 
The complaint contends that petitioners designated respondent a 
person of high interest on account of his race, religion, or national 
origin, in contravention of the First and Fifth Amendments to the 
Constitution. The complaint alleges that “the [FBI], under the 
direction of Defendant MUELLER, arrested and detained 
thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as part of its investigation of the 
events of September 11.” It further alleges that “[t]he policy of 
holding post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive 
conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI was 
approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions 
in the weeks after September 11, 2001.” Lastly, the complaint posits 
that petitioners “each knew of, condoned, and willfully and 
maliciously agreed to subject” respondent to harsh conditions of 
confinement “as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] 
religion, race, and/or national origin and for no legitimate 
penological interest.” The pleading names Ashcroft as the 
“principal architect” of the policy and identifies Mueller as 
“instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and 
implementation.”32 
Ashcroft and Mueller, who, as high-level government officials, were 
entitled to raise the defense of qualified immunity, moved to dismiss 
these claims on the ground that Iqbal had failed to offer sufficient 
allegations establishing their personal involvement in clearly 
unconstitutional conduct.33 
The district court rejected their motion, but did so based on the 
Conley “no set of facts” standard that was subsequently repudiated by the 
 
30 A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 101, 116–17), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1343129; Spencer, supra note 5, at 433. 
31 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1943 (2009). 
32 Id. at 1944 (citations omitted) (quoting First Amended Complaint and Jury 
Demand at ¶¶ 10–11, 47, 69, 96, Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 
2005 WL 2375202 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005)). 
33 Id. 
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Supreme Court in Twombly.34 The Second Circuit thus had to resolve 
whether the motion to dismiss should be granted under the revised 
pleading standards articulated in Twombly. The circuit court upheld the 
rejection of the motion, finding that Iqbal did offer direct factual 
allegations of Ashcroft’s and Mueller’s personal assent to the 
discriminatory policy, and added:  
[T]he allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller condoned and agreed 
to the discrimination that the Plaintiff alleges satisfies the 
plausibility standard without an allegation of subsidiary facts 
because of the likelihood that these senior officials would have 
concerned themselves with the formulation and implementation of 
policies dealing with the confinement of those arrested on federal 
charges in the New York City area and designated “of high interest” 
in the aftermath of 9/11.35 
In other words, the allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller condoned and 
agreed to the discrimination was a factual allegation, and it was plausible 
because these officials are likely to have been involved with the 
formulation of that policy, if such a policy is indeed shown to have 
existed. 
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Iqbal had failed to satisfy 
the pleading burden described in Twombly. The Court embraced the core 
components of Twombly that established plausibility pleading, to wit: 
[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require 
“detailed factual allegations,” but it demands more than an 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. 
A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic 
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Nor 
does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid 
of “further factual enhancement.”  
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain 
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.”  
A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 
requirement,” but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a 
defendant has acted unlawfully. 
Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” 
a defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’”36  
 
34 Elmaghraby v. Ashcroft, No. 04-CV-01809-JG-SMG, 2005 WL 2375202, at *29 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2005). 
35 Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 175–76 (2d Cir. 2007). 
36 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (bullet points added) (internal citations omitted) 
(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955 (2007)). 
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In this manner, the new statements that will now comprise the prelude to 
any federal civil pleading analysis were recited and enshrined. 
The Iqbal opinion then turned to setting forth the components of 
the “two-pronged approach” of Twombly. First, only “well-pleaded factual 
allegations” are entitled to the assumption of truth.37 Such allegations, 
said the court, are to be contrasted with “legal conclusions” or 
“[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by 
mere conclusory statements,” which a court is free to disregard.38 Thus, 
the initial step in the Twombly analysis is for the court to identify those 
allegations that are not well pleaded and set them to the side.39 Second, 
the court then determines whether the well-pleaded factual allegations 
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.40 How are courts to make 
this latter determination? The Court explained: 
Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief 
will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a context-specific task that 
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and 
common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the 
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the 
complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader 
is entitled to relief.”41  
Applying the first prong of this test to Iqbal’s complaint, the Court 
determined that the following allegations were not “well pleaded”: that 
Ashcroft and Mueller “knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously 
agreed to subject [him]” to harsh conditions of confinement “as a matter 
of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or national origin 
and for no legitimate penological interest” and that “Ashcroft was the 
‘principal architect’ of this invidious policy and that Mueller was 
‘instrumental’ in adopting and executing it.”42 In the Court’s view, these 
were “bare assertions” that “amount to nothing more than a ‘formulaic 
recitation of the elements’ of a constitutional discrimination claim.”43 
Thus, the Court concluded, “the allegations are conclusory and not 
entitled to be assumed true.”44 
Having disposed of Iqbal’s core allegations personally connecting 
Ashcroft and Mueller with the alleged unlawful policy, the Court turned 
to the matter of whether Iqbal’s remaining allegations plausibly showed 
entitlement to relief. Those remaining allegations that the Court 
accepted as “well pleaded” were as follows:  
 
37 Id. at 1950. 
38 Id. at 1949. 
39 Id. at 1950 (“[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by 
identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not 
entitled to the assumption of truth.”). 
40 Id. 
41 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
42 Id. at 1951 (internal citations omitted). 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
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[T]he [FBI], under the direction of Defendant MUELLER, 
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men . . . as 
part of its investigation of the events of September 11. . . . [and] 
[t]he policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly 
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by 
the FBI was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and 
MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 
2001.45  
The Court found these allegations to be merely consistent with—rather 
than suggestive of—wrongdoing by Ashcroft and Mueller, since, in its 
view, there were “more likely explanations” for the disparate impact of 
the law enforcement actions Iqbal challenged in his complaint.46 Thus, 
the Court concluded that Iqbal “has not ‘nudged [his] claims’ of 
invidious discrimination ‘across the line from conceivable to plausible.’”47 
III. FACT SKEPTICISM: ACCEPTING ONLY PLAUSIBLE 
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AS TRUE 
Although Iqbal involves the application of pleading standards 
developed previously in Twombly, the Iqbal Court’s rejection of Iqbal’s 
core allegations as too conclusory to be entitled to the assumption of 
truth reflects a disturbing extension of the Twombly doctrine in the 
direction of increased fact skepticism. Twombly resulted in many changes 
to federal civil pleading standards, including the retirement of Conley’s 
“no set of facts” standard, the revival of the need to plead substantiating 
facts that show entitlement to relief, and the formulation of plausibility as 
the relevant measure of a complaint’s sufficiency.48 But it did not cast 
aside the assumption-of-truth rule, which holds that a claimant’s factual 
allegations are entitled to be believed and accepted at the pleading 
stage,49 though it arguably opened the door for a weakening of that 
rule.50  
Iqbal is a clear challenge to the continuing vitality of the assumption-
of-truth rule given the Court’s poorly explained rejection of what were 
undeniably allegations that were non-conclusory and factual in nature. 
After detailing a discriminatory policy that the FBI was alleged to have 
adopted and implemented, Iqbal asserted that it was Ashcroft who was 
the “principal architect” of the policy and he claims that Mueller was 
 
45 Id. (citations omitted). 
46 Id. 
47 Id. (citations omitted). 
48 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1964–69 (2007). 
49 Id. at 1965. (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above 
the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are 
true (even if doubtful in fact).” (citations omitted)). 
50 Spencer, supra note 14, at 8–9 (discussing cases suggesting that “the Twombly 
Court’s statements regarding plausibility have given some courts a basis for applying 
more skepticism to factual allegations than the assumption-of-truth principle would 
seem to allow”). 
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“instrumental in [its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation,” 
adding that both “approved” and “agreed to” the policy.51 These are not 
conclusory assertions but rather plain-English descriptions of the 
phenomena they attempt to describe. There can be no question that if I 
were to say “Mr. Smith was the ‘principal architect’ of the Chrysler 
building,” that would be a non-conclusory factual claim, as would the 
statement that “Ms. Smith ‘approved’ the design plans for the Chrysler 
building.” These statements are factual because they make claims about 
what transpired and who took certain actions. Thus, the Court had no 
problem accepting as factual and non-conclusory Iqbal’s allegation that 
“[t]he policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly 
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI 
was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER.”52  
To see through the Court’s attempt to classify Iqbal’s allegations 
about Ashcroft and Mueller’s relationship with the alleged discriminatory 
policy as conclusory, we need to have a clear sense of what a conclusory 
or “bald” allegation is. A conclusory claim is one that uses legal 
terminology to describe conduct rather than factual statements. That is, 
rather than describing what happened from a reporter’s perspective—
the who, what, when, where, and how—a conclusory assertion takes the 
desired legal conclusion one wants attached to the occurrence and uses it 
to describe the occurrence itself. For example, a conclusory way to allege 
that “the defendant crossed over the yellow line and collided with my 
vehicle, causing the plaintiff various injuries” would be to assert that “the 
defendant negligently caused injury to the plaintiff.”53 In the 
discrimination context, a conclusory assertion might be that “the 
defendant discriminates in hiring decisions,” rather than, “the defendant 
systematically rejects Hispanic applicants with qualifications similar to 
those of non-Hispanic applicants that it hires.” The latter statement 
reports facts; the former statement substitutes a legal characterization of 
those facts and dispenses with factual reportage. Non-conclusory factual 
claims make assertions about what happened without regard to the legal 
characterization or consequences of those occurrences or omissions: the 
defendant “purchased” this product; the defendant “did not attempt to 
assist the plaintiff”; the defendant “fired” the plaintiff, et cetera. In other 
words, allegations comprised of subjects and verbs, not just legal 
adjectives and adverbs are non-conclusory. 
The question for one scrutinizing Iqbal is whether an assertion that a 
person “agreed” to do something, or “approved” of something, is 
conclusory or factual. If those terms are used to report the fact that the 
individual in question gave her assent, there would not appear to be a 
 
51 First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, supra note 32, at 4–5, 17, 33. 
52 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
53 Form 11, which sufficiently alleges a simple negligence claim, goes beyond this 
by describing how the defendant injured the plaintiff: by hitting him with a vehicle. 
FED. R. CIV. P. Form 11 (“On date, at place, the defendant negligently drove a motor 
vehicle against plaintiff.”). 
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more specific, non-conclusory, way to communicate such information 
other than to use the terms common to that purpose, such as “approval” 
or “agreement.” Alleging that a defendant “approved” something is non-
conclusory because it does not make a claim about the legal character or 
consequences of the defendant’s assent, but rather simply reports its 
presence. Thus, again, when the Iqbal majority accepts Iqbal’s allegation 
that “[t]he policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly 
restrictive conditions of confinement until they were ‘cleared’ by the FBI 
was approved by Defendants ASHCROFT and MUELLER,”54 it is 
acknowledging that claims of approval are not conclusory per se. 
How then should we understand the Court’s prior rejection of 
Iqbal’s allegations connecting Ashcroft and Mueller to the discriminatory 
policy given the use of similar terms of “agreement” or equally factual 
and non-conclusory terms such as “principal architect” or being 
“instrumental” in the policy’s development and implementation?55 It 
cannot be, as the Court claims, that these statements are too “bald” and 
conclusory to be accepted as true given that the allegations describe what 
is alleged to have occurred in similar fashion as the accepted allegation 
that those defendants “approved” the policy of holding detainees in 
highly restrictive conditions.56 In other words, the statement “the 
defendants approved the policy of holding post-September-11th 
detainees in highly restrictive conditions of confinement” and the 
statement “the defendants approved the policy of subjecting defendants 
to harsh conditions of confinement solely based on their race, religion, 
and/or national origin” are offered at equal levels of specificity; one 
cannot be deemed too bald and conclusory, and the other well pleaded, 
based on any sensible understanding of those concepts, given the 
statements’ common reliance on the term “approved.”57 
Since the conclusory label cannot credibly be applied to Iqbal’s 
rejected allegations as a valid rationale for discarding them, something 
 
54 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951 (emphasis added). 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 This is the point made by Justice Souter in his Iqbal dissent when he wrote: 
“[T]he majority’s holding that the statements it selects are conclusory cannot be 
squared with its treatment of certain other allegations in the complaint as 
nonconclusory. For example, the majority takes as true the statement that ‘[t]he 
policy of holding post-September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of 
confinement until they were “cleared” by the FBI was approved by Defendants 
ASHCROFT and MUELLER in discussions in the weeks after September 11, 
2001.’ . . . If, as the majority says, these allegations are not conclusory, then I cannot 
see why the majority deems it merely conclusory when Iqbal alleges that (1) after 
September 11, the FBI designated Arab Muslim detainees as being of ‘high interest’ 
‘because of the race, religion, and national origin of the detainees, and not because 
of any evidence of the detainees’ involvement in supporting terrorist activity,’ and (2) 
Ashcroft and Mueller ‘knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed’ to 
that discrimination. By my lights, there is no principled basis for the majority’s 
disregard of the allegations linking Ashcroft and Mueller to their subordinates’ 
discrimination.” Id. at 1961 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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else must be at play. I submit that what the Court is revealing in its 
rejection of Iqbal’s factual allegations regarding the involvement of 
Ashcroft and Mueller in shaping the policy is that it wants to know Iqbal’s 
basis for making such factual claims about those two officials.58 That is, 
the Court is seeking evidence to substantiate the factual assertion of 
Ashcroft and Mueller’s design of, and assent to, the discriminatory policy. 
Had Iqbal made allegations identical to those that the Court rejected but 
also referred to, and attached, a memo to the complaint from Mueller 
describing and imposing the discriminatory policy, the Court certainly 
would not have still treated Iqbal’s allegations as inadequate.59 Indeed, a 
recent Ninth Circuit opinion applying Iqbal suggests as much, noting that 
Iqbal’s complaint failed because “Iqbal’s complaint contained no factual 
allegations detailing statements made by Mueller and Ashcroft regarding 
discrimination.”60 The Iqbal majority is thus not using “conclusory” to 
mean legalistic allegations lacking factual content, but rather has defined 
a conclusory assertion as one that lacks evidence under circumstances in 
which the Court feels that such evidence is required.  
This is where context comes into play. In certain contexts, the Court 
does not feel that additional evidence is required because the factual 
assertion is not controversial, it is expected, or it is self-evident from the 
 
58 Justice Scalia vocalized this interest during oral argument of Iqbal, stating, “I 
don’t know on what basis any of these allegations against the high-level officials are 
made.” Transcript of Oral Argument at 39, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) 
(No. 07-1015). 
59 Clearly, plaintiffs would not have access to such a “smoking gun” document 
prior to discovery absent a whistleblower or leak of the document to the press or the 
public. Indeed, it is plaintiffs facing such information asymmetry who will be 
burdened most significantly by the fact skepticism endorsed in Iqbal. 
60 Al-Kidd v. Ashcroft, 580 F.3d 949, 975 (9th Cir. 2009). “Here, unlike Iqbal’s 
allegations, al-Kidd’s complaint ‘plausibly suggest[s]’ unlawful conduct, and does 
more than contain bare allegations of an impermissible policy. While the complaint 
similarly alleges that Ashcroft is the ‘principal architect’ of the policy, the complaint 
in this case contains specific statements that Ashcroft himself made regarding the 
post-September 11th use of the material witness statute. Ashcroft stated that 
enhanced tactics, such as the use of the material witness statute, ‘form one part of the 
department’s concentrated strategy to prevent terrorist attacks by taking suspected 
terrorists off the street,’ and that ‘[a]ggressive detention of lawbreakers and material 
witnesses is vital to preventing, disrupting or delaying new attacks.’ Other top DOJ 
officials candidly admitted that the material witness statute was viewed as an 
important ‘investigative tool’ where they could obtain ‘evidence’ about the witness. 
The complaint also contains reference to congressional testimony from FBI Director 
Mueller, stating that al-Kidd’s arrest was one of the government’s anti-terrorism 
successes—without any caveat that al-Kidd was arrested only as a witness. 
Comparatively, Iqbal’s complaint contained no factual allegations detailing 
statements made by Mueller and Ashcroft regarding discrimination. The specific 
allegations in al-Kidd’s complaint plausibly suggest something more than just bare 
allegations of improper purpose; they demonstrate that the Attorney General 
purposefully used the material witness statute to detain suspects whom he wished to 
investigate and detain preventatively, and that al-Kidd was subjected to this policy.” Id. 
(citations omitted). 
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perspective of the Court.61 Conversely, when the factual assertion is 
thought to be “unrealistic,” “nonsensical,” or “extravagantly fanciful,”62 
more evidentiary facts must be offered to make the factual assertion in 
question believable or “plausible.” Thus, when the Iqbal majority accepts 
the allegation that Mueller “approved” the policy of holding post-
September-11th detainees in highly restrictive conditions of 
confinement, but rejects the allegation that Ashcroft and Mueller 
“approved” the discriminatory policy, the former assertion is consistent 
with the Iqbal majority’s understanding about what the FBI Director and 
Attorney General would approve, while the latter is inconsistent with 
their settled expectations. As such, the latter assertion requires additional 
evidence to be taken seriously and accepted as true. 
At bottom, then, the Court’s rejection of certain factual allegations 
as “too conclusory” is really a statement that (1) the allegations are 
factual claims that assert the unexpected, particularly about certain kinds 
of defendants—government officials (Iqbal) or major corporations 
(Twombly) for example; (2) as such, the allegations require additional 
supporting facts to be believed; and (3) such facts are lacking in the 
claimant’s statement of his claim. Needless to say, this attitude towards 
factual allegations is inappropriate; rejecting facts because they report 
occurrences that members of the Court would find to be out-of-step with 
their expectations regarding an official’s behavior is a complete violation 
of the assumption-of-truth rule. The whole point of the rule is to obligate 
courts to accept factual claims regardless of how fanciful or far-fetched 
they might be,63 and then make an assessment of whether the defendant 
is entitled to relief. If what he says happened, happened, there will be 
subsequent opportunities to put the plaintiff to proof.64 Lawsuits are all 
 
61 See Spencer, supra note 14, at 13–18 (explaining how presumptions of 
propriety or impropriety attach to various factual circumstances based on their 
consonance with our ordinary understandings about such occurrences). 
62 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. It is interesting that the Court felt the need to 
expressly clarify that it was not discarding Iqbal’s claims on the basis that they were 
“unrealistic,” “nonsensical,” or “extravagantly fanciful,” suggesting some insecurity on 
its part regarding the credibility of its stated rationale. 
63 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007) (“[A] well-pleaded 
complaint may proceed even if it strikes a savvy judge that actual proof of those facts 
is improbable, and ‘that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.’” (quoting Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974))). 
64 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (permitting litigants to seek judgment on claims that 
lack factual support after the opportunity for discovery). See also Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 
1976 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under the relaxed pleading standards of the Federal 
Rules, the idea was not to keep litigants out of court but rather to keep them in. The 
merits of a claim would be sorted out during a flexible pretrial process and, as 
appropriate, through the crucible of trial.”); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 
506, 512–13 (2002). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal 
discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues 
and to dispose of unmeritorious claims. . . . ‘The provisions for discovery are so 
flexible and the provisions for pretrial procedure and summary judgment so effective, 
that attempted surprise in federal practice is aborted very easily, synthetic issues 
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about claiming the unexpected and seeking redress for deviations from 
legal norms and acceptable standards of conduct. A pleading standard 
that permits courts to disbelieve factual claims because they are felt to be 
extremely atypical deviations, is fundamentally at odds with our norms 
regarding access to court and presents a cruel and seemingly 
insurmountable obstacle to certain claimants at the outset of litigation. 
By making the ultimate plausibility of a claim depend in part on the 
credibility of underlying factual allegations, the Iqbal Court is also 
treading on the traditional province of the jury. One of the bases for the 
assumption-of-truth rule is that it is for the jury to determine questions of 
fact, including making determinations about which facts to believe and 
which factual claims to discredit, based on the evidence presented at 
trial. By permitting courts to refuse to accept factual allegations by 
labeling them conclusory, simply because they lack additional evidentiary 
details that would render them more believable, the Court empowers 
judges to preempt the jury’s assessment and substitute their own 
judgments regarding the credibility of factual claims. This is not 
consistent with the jury right, as Professor Thomas has argued 
elsewhere.65  
IV. PATRICIAN BIAS: IQBAL AND THE RESTRICTIVE 
ETHOS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Beyond constituting a violation of the assumption-of-truth rule and 
interfering with the jury right, the Iqbal majority’s new fact skepticism is 
problematic because it derives from, and gives voice to, what appears to 
be the institutional biases of the Justices, as elite insiders with various 
presumptions about the conduct and motives of other fellow societal 
elites. This bias reveals itself when plaintiffs draw factual inferences that 
the Justices feel are less likely explanations than inferences that their own 
experience would suggest. For example, in Iqbal, although the majority 
acknowledges that the alleged facts are consistent with “petitioners’ 
purposefully designating detainees ‘of high interest’ because of their 
race, religion, or national origin,” they assert that there are “more likely 
 
detected, and the gravamen of the dispute brought frankly into the open for the 
inspection of the court.’” Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 5 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & 
ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1202, at 76 (2 ed. 1990)). 
65 See Suja A. Thomas, Why the Motion to Dismiss Is Now Unconstitutional, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 1851, 1882 (2008). “Where the Court first strays from the requirements of the 
Seventh Amendment in Twombly . . . is where it permits courts to consider only 
plausible inferences from the facts that favor the plaintiff. This determination 
necessarily permits a court to assess the plausibility of the inferences that arise from 
the facts alleged by the plaintiff. This was not permitted under the common law. 
Next, the Court also strays from the Seventh Amendment’s command when it has 
told the courts to also review plausible inferences that favor the defendant and weigh 
those against plausible inferences that favor the plaintiff. These were all decisions 
that were reserved for the jury at common law.” Id. (citations omitted). 
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explanations” of the officials’ conduct.66 The Iqbal majority goes on to 
explain that the “obvious alternative explanation” for the challenged 
arrests is that because the perpetrators of the September 11th attacks 
were “Arab Muslim hijackers,” the arrests “were likely lawful and justified 
by [Mueller’s] nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were 
illegally present in the United States and who had potential connections 
to those who committed terrorist acts,” and that “[i]t should come as no 
surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to arrest and 
detain individuals because of their suspected link to the attacks would 
produce a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims.”67 
Beyond the fact that Iqbal is Pakistani, not Arab—a distinction the 
Court does not bother to notice—what makes this alternative explanation 
“obvious” and “more likely”? Does the Court actually know that Director 
Mueller had a “nondiscriminatory intent” as it asserts in Iqbal? Clearly the 
Court is drawing on its “experience and common sense,” as it indicated 
would be necessary.68 But what needs to be understood is that the Court’s 
“experience and common sense” is not universal but rather is shaped by 
their perspective and bias as societal elites who suppose that such 
discrimination is rare.69 
This insider or patrician bias has revealed itself in other cases as well. 
In Twombly, although the Court accepted that the facts described were 
consistent with the presence of an unlawful agreement to restrain trade, 
its perspective led it to prefer the alternate possibility that “natural” 
market forces explained the behavior,70 or as the Iqbal Court put it, 
“unchoreographed free-market behavior” was the “more likely” 
explanation.71 Scott v. Harris—a case involving claims of a police officer’s 
use of deadly force to end a high-speed vehicle chase—presents another 
example of this bias.72 There, the Court sidestepped the traditional 
requirement of accepting the plaintiff’s versions of the facts, in the 
context of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, by ruling that its 
 
66 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1951. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1950. 
69 See Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1154 
(2008) (“[T]he courts tend to reflect the insider view that discrimination is rare and 
that most claims are meritless, rather than the opposing view that discrimination is 
pervasive.”); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 937 (2006) (“[I]n addition to deference and a commitment 
to employment at will, courts also have an ideology that discounts the possibility of 
discrimination in race and national origin cases.”). 
70 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1971–73 (2007). 
71 Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950. The Court also betrayed similar pro-corporate 
presumptions in Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S 574 
(1986), when it endorsed the following sentiment: “‘The predation-recoupment 
story . . . does not make sense, and we are left with the more plausible inference that 
the Japanese firms did not sell below cost in the first place. They were just engaged in 
hard competition.’” Id. at 591 n.15 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of 
Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 27 (1984)).  
72 127 S. Ct. 1769 (2007). 
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own view of the record conclusively demonstrated the falsity of the 
plaintiff’s factual claims.73 Specifically, the Scott majority said that a factual 
dispute is not “genuine” if the plaintiff’s version of the facts “is blatantly 
contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it.”74 
The majority went on to base its rejection of the plaintiff’s claim—that he 
was not driving in a manner that endangered human life—on its 
interpretation of a videotape that captured a police chase involving the 
plaintiff.75 Taking up Justice Breyer’s invitation—to view the tape and 
judge Scott’s conduct for themselves76—three researchers conducted a 
study in which 1,350 diverse members of the public were asked to view 
the tape and share their perspectives.77 Not surprisingly, although a 
majority of respondents reached similar conclusions as the Scott majority 
after viewing the tape, others reached conflicting conclusions, with 
respondents’ interpretation of the videotape tending to vary according to 
an array of demographic and personal characteristics including race, 
socio-economic status, and political party identification.78 
What we see in these opinions is the Justices’ willingness to prefer 
their own interpretation of facts over other interpretations, leaving no 
room for the possibility that other understandings may have validity. 
Further, these Justices appear to not be cognizant of79 (or concerned 
with) the fact that their own views are connected to the biases they have 
as relatively well-to-do societal elites who lack the diversity and 
experiences that a civil jury might better represent.80 Indeed, an 
important function of the jury is to screen out this institutional bias,81 
 
73 Id. at 1776. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 1780 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
77 Dan M. Kahan et al., Whose Eyes Are You Going to Believe? Scott v. Harris and the 
Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 837, 841 (2009). 
78 Id.  
79 I should note that at least Justice Scalia seems to have acknowledged the elite 
bias of the Court: “When the Court takes sides in the culture wars, it tends to be with 
the knights rather than the villeins—and more specifically with the Templars, 
reflecting the views and values of the lawyer class from which the Court’s Members 
are drawn.” Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
80 As one scholar has noted, “[a]ll nine of the Justices of the late Rehnquist 
Court were graduates of elite schools with either little practice experience or practice 
experience largely limited to constitutional litigation or defense-side civil litigation.” 
Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing 
Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097, 1117 n.66 (2006). 
Others have similarly commented. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, What’s So Great About 
Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 146, 188–92 (1998) (“[J]udicial review is 
systematically biased in favor of culturally elite values. . . . Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court, indeed of any state or federal appellate court, are overwhelmingly 
upper-middle or upper-class and extremely well educated, usually at the nation’s 
more elite universities.”). 
81 Alexandra Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576, 589 (2008) 
(“The jury trial . . . helps avoid the systemic bias that might develop if all cases were 
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making it even more disconcerting that the Iqbal decision gave judges 
more power to scrutinize facts at the pleading stage. 
This insider bias and its affirmation in Iqbal are quite dangerous and 
alarming developments in the civil justice arena. In previous writings, I 
have suggested that the Twombly decision reflected a shift toward a 
restrictive ethos in civil procedure,82 meaning an ethos oriented more 
towards protecting the interests of defendants—particularly those from 
the dominant or commercial class—against the civil claims of members 
of societal out-groups.83 For example, employees who may have suffered 
unlawful discrimination will find it more difficult to state a claim under 
Twombly when the facts needed to satisfy the plausibility standard are 
unavailable to them. The circumstance is similar for putative plaintiffs 
seeking to pursue conspiracy claims if they lack particulars that might 
substantiate the claim of an agreement. Put simply, the Twombly approach 
to pleading represents a move in a restrictive direction because it makes 
it more difficult for claimants to get their claims into court.  
Iqbal ratifies the Court’s commitment to a more restrictive approach 
to pleading but it also portends something darker and more ominous. 
Iqbal reflects a certain judicial mood toward litigation, an attitude of 
hostility and skepticism toward supplicants with alleged grievances 
against the government or against the powerful who make up the 
dominant class.84 Increasingly, members of the Court in cases like Iqbal 
and Twombly appear to see allegations not through the lens of detached, 
impartial observers, but rather through the eyes of conforming social 
elites. Thus, corporations are presumed to operate in legitimate ways 
motivated only by the quest for lawful profit; law enforcement and other 
government officials are presumed to operate by-the-book in a focused 
mission to protect innocents from the multitude of deviants; and 
employers are presumed to make hiring, firing, and promotion or 
transfer decisions based wholly on merit rather than on prejudice against 
members of various protected classes. Such a perspective ends up 
favoring civil defendants, at least when they are arrayed as adversaries 
 
decided by professional judges. . . . [T]he introduction of democratic decisionmakers 
avoids the bias of an entrenched judicial elite.”). 
82 Spencer, supra note 30, at 116–17; Spencer, supra note 5, at 433. 
83 Spencer, supra note 30, at 117–19. 
84 Professor Siegel, in a study of the Court’s hostility to litigation during the 
Rehnquist era, made the following observation: “In myriad ways, the Court has made 
life very difficult for civil plaintiffs. To take but a few examples, the Court has 
narrowly construed statutes and case law to reduce and eliminate remedial options. It 
has protected governments and governmental officials from financial liability 
through expansive immunity doctrines and cramped interpretations of the federal 
fee-shifting statutes. It has consistently enforced form arbitration agreements that 
shift cases from courts to alternative forums without regard for the practical 
consequences to potential plaintiffs. And it has birthed novel constitutional 
limitations on the scope of recoverable damages.” Siegel, supra note 80, at 1117–18 
(citations omitted). 
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against members of various societal out-groups.85 Such a perspective is 
also inappropriately naïve about the very real existence of corporate and 
official misconduct that has existed in the past,86 and that may be 
reflected in some of the complaints the Court’s stricter pleading standard 
will tend to reject. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The charges of bias leveled against the Iqbal Court herein will 
certainly be decried and denied by most. But it seems apparent that the 
Court is treating clearly factual allegations as conclusory solely on the 
ground that it does not believe them, absent additional supporting 
information. Further, the Court’s skepticism with respect to certain 
factual allegations derives from their worldview and perspective as 
societal elites with various presumptions regarding the conduct of other 
members of the dominant or governing class, particularly when opposed 
by members of social out-groups. Beyond that, Iqbal also gives us a whiff 
of the duplicity of the Justices in the Iqbal majority and their true 
approach to judging at the Supreme Court level. Popular myth regarding 
the role of Supreme Court Justices holds that they are to be like 
umpires—simply calling balls and strikes—not making the rules. “Judges 
should interpret the law, not make the law” is the partisan mantra offered 
in supposed contradistinction to the notion of the “activist” judge, who 
molds the law as she sees fit to suit her own substantive aspirational ends. 
Well, in Iqbal, we see the Justices offering their own version of activism in 
service of what can only be surmised to be their own hostility to litigation 
in general, and challenges to government authority in particular. That is 
unfortunate, but not new. But so long as decisions like Iqbal are 
recognized for what they are—subversions of law to achieve the restrictive 
ends of societal elites—there is some hope that the complete slide toward 
restrictive procedure can be abated and avoided. 
 
85 See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate 
Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947, 
949 (2002). “Appellate courts are indeed more favorable to defendants than are trial 
judges and juries. . . . [T]he defendants’ advantage grew as the case better fit the 
format of little victim against big defendant, just as it grew when the case had been 
decided by a jury. We found these tendencies in personal injury cases, as well as in 
cases involving nongovernmental, noncorporate, nonforeign, and in-state plaintiffs. 
These tendencies supported our theory that the appellate courts were striving to 
undo trial level favoritism toward plaintiffs, which the appellate judges were 
imagining.” Id. But see Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliot, Beware of Numbers (and 
Unsupported Claims of Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 723 (2002). 
86 See, e.g., Karen Blumenthal, How I Got Burned by Beanie Babies, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
26, 2009, at D1. “More than three years after the crash of 1929, a Senate investigation 
unveiled one jaw-dropping misbehavior after another. The head of Chase National 
Bank had been selling his own bank’s stock short while publicly urging others to buy. 
The former chief of National City Bank—now Citigroup—was secretly receiving a 
huge annual salary in retirement. Senate investigator Ferdinand Pecora called it ‘a 
shocking disclosure of low standards in high places.’” Id. 
